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CREDIT CONTROL INSTRUMENTS IN A DUAL BANKING SYSTEM: 
LEVERAGE CONTROL RATE (LCR) – A PROPOSAL   
 
Prof. Emeritus Dr. Zubair HASAN1 
 
Abstract 
 
Islam banishes interest. This raises two questions contextual to Central Banking. First, can 
Islamic banks create credit like the conventional? We shall argue that Islamic banks cannot 
avoid credit creation; an imperative for staying in the market where they operate in 
competition with their conventional rivals. Evidently, the interest rate policy would not be 
applicable to them as a control measure. This leads us to the second question: What could 
possibly replace the interest rate for Islamic banks? In reply, the paper suggests what it 
calls a leverage control rate (LCR) as an addition to Central Banks’ credit control arsenal. 
The proposed rate is derived from the sharing of profit ratio in Islamic banking. It is 
contended that the new measure has an edge over the old fashioned interest rate instrument 
which it can in fact replace with advantage. It can possibly be a common measure in a dual 
system.   
 
Key words: Central Banking; Credit creation; leverage control rate. (LCR); Islamic banks; 
Profit sharing 
 
ÇİFT BANKACILIK SİSTEMİNDE KREDİ KONTROL ARAÇLARI: 
KALDIRAÇ KONTROL ORANI –BİR ÖNERİ 
 
Özet 
 
İslamiyet faizi yasaklamaktadır. Bu durum merkez Bankası bağlamında iki soruyu gündeme 
getiriyor. Birincisi, geleneksel bankalar gibi İslami bankalarda kredi yaratabilirler mi? 
İslami bankaların kredi yaratmadan imtina edemiyeceğini iddia edecegiz, çünkü geleneksel 
rakipleriyle rekabet ederek piyasada ayakta kalabilmeleri gerekmektedir. Faiz oranının 
onlar için bir kontrol aracı olamıyacağı aşikardır. Bu durum bizi ikinci soruya götürüyor: 
İslami bankalar için faiz oranının yerine ne ikame edilebilir? Cevap olarak bu makale, 
Merkez bankasının kredi kontrol silahlarına ilave olarak ‘kaldıraç kontrol oranını’ (LCR) 
önermektedir.  
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Merkez bankacılığı, kredi yaratma, kaldıraç control oranı, İslami 
bankalar, kar bölüşümü. 
                                                            
1Zubair Hasan is a former Prof of Islamic Economics and Finance, INCEIF, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. 
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1. Introduction 
This paper deals with an aspect of monetary policy in a dual financial system where 
the Islamic and mainstream financial institutions operate side by side in a competitive 
setting. The policy addresses a number of objectives including the mobilization of resources 
for development, promotion of distributional equity and maintaining stable the internal and 
external value of domestic currency. However, we shall presently be looking at monetary 
policy contextual to credit control measures a Central Bank employs to mitigate volatility in 
macroeconomic variables. Such volatility often promotes the proclivity to crises that 
snowball to inflict severe injuries on national economies across the globe. The 2007-2010 
turmoil is the recent example.  
Such an exercise needs a prior relook on the process of credit creation and its 
regulation, especially because one cannot ignore the recent emergence and phenomenal 
growth of Islamic banking across the globe in 90 countries – developed and developing –
Islamic banks operate in competition with the conventional. Thus, in finance, the expansion 
of what one may call a dual banking system is on the rise. The scenario raises some ticklish 
questions that have to be answered prior to discussing the stability issue, the focus of this 
paper.  
Required is the discussion on three issues. One, since sharing of profit ratio replaces 
interest rate in Islamic banking, how would this ratio be determined? Two, can or should 
Islamic banks be allowed to create credit the same way as do the conventional?  Third, if 
yes, how could this ratio be controlled and to what effect? It is in answering this last 
question that the paper presents a new instrument for consideration of the learned. 
Thus, Section 2 of the paper briefly deals with the need for and the process of credit 
creation. Section 3 highlights the linkage between profit sharing and return to capital. In 
Section 4 we explain the proposed instrument for credit control and unveil its ramifications. 
Section 5 contains a bit of digression, relevant though. It discusses the connection between 
risk, profit and finance to arrest a misleading tendency of providing prosthetics to rivet risk-
sharing as the sole principle of Islamic finance.2 Finally, Section 6 contains a few 
concluding observations. 
2.  The credit creation process 
Capitalism not only presupposes the existence of hired factors of production - 
workers and the natural resources – in the economy but also of an initial facility of finance 
provided by bank credit to pay for circulating capital including wages. The recent heterodox 
                                                            
2 The latest example promotive of such discussions is Nabil and Mirakhor (2015).  For a critical 
appraisal of the literature on risk-sharing in Islamic finance, see (Hasan 2015). 
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view that finance is a sort of invisible ex ante flow in modern economies has element of 
truth; it links well with Keynes (1930) according recognition to the importance of money as 
a financial asset. The recognition led to viewing money as an interest bearing claim the 
banks could create or destroy at will in response to variations in the demand for money 
(liquidity) even though it carried no intrinsic value. 
   Islamic banks operate in a capitalist system in competition with their conventional 
counterparts. They cannot do business in defiance of the systemic requirements. They can 
possibly observe the Islamic ban on interest but would find survival threatened without 
credit creation. Fractional reserve system is a pre-requisite for credit creation. Hence, 
suggestion of keeping 100% reserve against deposits in Islamic banking is impracticable. It 
would thus be helpful to see briefly how banks create credit to understand and evaluate 
measures the Central Banks use for controlling it to keep the system stable.     
How the fractional reserve system enables banks to create money is easy to see. 
Initially banks have cash deposits. Each bank knows by experience that on a normal day 
most people withdraw only a fraction in cash from their accounts. So, retaining a safe 
fraction of cash deposits, the bank lends the rest to third parties on interest. But it asks each 
borrower to deposit the loan money in his account with the bank. Thus, loans create 
deposits, appearing on the opposite sides of its balance sheet. The bank treats credit deposits 
as cash deposits and advances loan out of loan so to say. The process multiplies deposits 
raising an inverted loan pyramid. Suppose each bank retains on an average F fraction of 
cash deposits as reserve to meet the daily withdrawals while the Central Bank of the country 
wants banks to maintain with it a minimum fraction R of their deposits – cash + credit – in 
the form of cash. How much credit can a bank create given these constraints? The credit 
multiplier M provides the answer. Ignoring proof, M can be calculated as under.              
M = 1/F [1 – R]                     (1)                                  
To illustrate, assume a bank has $50m in cash deposits and has to keep F = 0.1 
fraction of the sum every moment in its safe to meet the daily withdrawal demands. 
Furthermore, suppose that each commercial bank is required to maintain 5% of its deposits 
–cash plus credit - in the form of cash with the Central Bank, implying that R = 0.05. The 
credit multiplier M will then be 10 x 0.95 = 9.5. The $50m cash deposit with the bank will 
enable it to have a total deposit worth 50 x 9.5= $475m. If we take out $50m cash deposits 
from the total, the remaining $425m would be the credit-on-credit or loan deposits the bank 
has generated. The process creates an inverted pyramid of credit money which must of 
necessity be shaky; a narrow tip supporting a broad heavy top (Hasan 2014, 41). 
Note that an individual bank cannot create credit disproportionate to others in the 
system because on balance it will soon find its net cash inflows reducing via inter-bank 
clearances. The cash string forces it to remain with the group. However, the credit creation 
power of the banking system as a whole is tremendous as mutual claims largely cancel out 
against each other. For the banking system as a whole, the causality tends to move from 
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bank credit to deposits; not the other way round. Banks are not a “cloakroom”. Given the 
institutional framework of free markets, the banking system can meet any demand of 
business for credit at the current rate of interest the banks unilaterally determine (Egmont 
2012, 2). The interest received on this huge amount minus the part of it payable to cash 
depositors and other operating expenses, all belong to the bank owners which they share 
with their managers and agents. 
Banking is thus an exceedingly lucrative business. Maturity transformation via 
renewals converts short-term funding into the long-term. Leverage gains tend to make 
businesses over-adventurous. Rising profit margins3 lure banks continue pumping in the air 
until the balloon bursts, economies roll down the hill; unemployment becomes rampant. 
Rising leverage gains fuel greed and have largely been the cause of frequent financial 
turmoil like the one world faced after 2007. The solution is seen in raising the capital 
coverage of borrowings for restraining credit expansion beyond the limits of safety. 
Standard capital adequacy ratios are being developed under what are known as Basel 
Accords4. However, evidence is mounting to show that minimum capital requirements like 
the tier capital ratio – the CAR – are having little success in reducing the risk of bank 
failures (Nowak 2011, 3). 
If the credit creation tends to fuel leverage lure causing injurious fluctuations in the 
economy, why not ask banks to keep with them all time the legal tender (base) money 
people deposit with them? This is the same as the insistence of Islamic economists on a 
100% reserve system instead of the fractional. Of late, one hears some supporting voices in 
the mainstream economics as well. To me, that is neither operable nor expedient. The 
demand for a 100% reserve must create rigidity in money supply response to the genuine 
seasonal ups and downs in money demand; it may even result in as much trouble if not more 
as the current fractional system unleashes.  
One compelling reason for allowing banks to operate on the fractional reserve basis 
is that the act facilitates the adjusting of money supply to seasonal demand variations. 
                                                            
3 A PhD research work of Nurhafiza Abdul Kader Malim at INCEIF (2015) on bank-margins poses an 
interesting question: How should one interpret high/low bank margins? High margins benefit banks 
but at the same time they make financing expensive for the society and curb growth. Reverse would be 
the impact of low margins. How to build a trade off?  
 
4 For a critical evaluation of Basel Accords, see Hasan (2014). The Capital Adequacy ratio is found as 
under. 
1
assetsweightedriskAggregate
capital2Tiercapital1Tier
CAR 


  
 Capital adequacy ratios are a measure of the amount of a bank's capital expressed as a percentage of 
its risk weighted credit exposures. An international standard which recommends minimum capital 
adequacy ratios has been developed to ensure banks can absorb a reasonable level of losses before 
becoming insolvent. Applying minimum capital adequacy ratios serves to protect depositors and 
promote the stability and efficiency of the financial system”: The Central Bank of New Zeeland. 
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Figure1 shows how credit creation keeps demand for money commensurate with normal 
base money supply in the economy (Hasan 2014; 42-43). Thus, credit creation is an 
economic imperative and Islamic banks need not be denied the option to promote their well- 
 
 
                Figure1. Normal base money supply and seasonal demand variations adjusted by credit money changes 
 
 being. Anyway, they have had to fall in line with the global practices here also as elsewhere. 
Monetary authorities in various Muslim countries and the IFSB are seized with the issue: 
the regulatory frameworks are being revamped and new standards are being designed. 
Credit control has to be part of the exercise. As Islamic banks replace interest with profit 
rate, let us see how such a rate comes into existence. 
3. Profit sharing and return on capital 
Participatory finance is regarded as the high point of Islamic finance where losses are 
shared in the same ratios as the capital contributions of the parties but the sharing of profit 
arrangement is not to be the same.  The interesting question then is how the sharing of profit 
ratio is determined? Of course, it is settled by negotiations between the parties. But there 
have to be some factors guiding the negotiations. Mudarabah is a contract in which a 
financier, say a bank, provides funds to an entrepreneur (firm) for investing in a business 
venture to share profits in an agreed proportion, losses falling on capital alone.5 This view 
implies what we may call a pure mudarabah model where the financier is assumed to 
provide the entire capital to an empty handed entrepreneur; the model fits well even today to 
small partnership businesses to undertake specific projects. But the modern economic scene 
                                                             
5 Paraphrasing Bank Negara Malaysia, mudarabah is an agreement made between a party who 
provides the capital and the other - an entrepreneur – who is thus enabled to carry out business projects 
on the basis of sharing profit in pre-agreed ratios. However, losses are borne solely by the provider of 
funds. Bank Negara Malaysia <http://www.bnm.gov.my/index.php?ch=174&pg=469&ac=383> 
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is dominated by large corporations that have long eclipsed small proprietary businesses in 
size and significance. Likewise, banks have almost completely replaced personal financing 
of the earlier era with institutional arrangements. What realistically fits the present situations 
is the model of what we can term as mixed mudarabah, where the bank is an outside 
financier providing fund to running businesses on a profit sharing basis. Corporations 
operate mostly with their (owners) shareholders’ money supplemented by bank finance, if 
need be. Banks mostly use customer deposits for providing finance to various sorts of 
borrowers – individuals, firms and public institutions.  
Banks mostly employ the two-tier mudarabah models to work as financial 
intermediaries. On the one hand they obtain deposits from the clients under profit (loss) 
sharing arrangements; on the other hand they finance clients using these deposits plus their 
own money under the same sort of profit (loss) sharing contracts. It is obvious that the 
sharing ratio of profit with the depositors would be less than the sharing ratio with the 
borrowers, the difference being the banks’ margin The profit sharing ratio is a function of 
the rate or return on investment, the leverage ratio, rate of interest and risk premium (Hasan, 
2010: 2014).. We shall show that the sharing ratio with the depositors can be used as a credit 
control measure by the central banks.  
4. Credit control: the proposed instrument 
In the classical view of mudaabah the entrepreneur was an empty-handed person, the 
financier providing the entire capital. The business constituted a one off short-run project; 
the concept of a large sized running business requiring perennial investment, even as its 
owners could change overtime, was not there. The scenario today is totally different. 
Corporate businesses need large investments on a long-run basis; Mudarabah has to join in 
a participatory financing program.  In such a program the bank as mudarib would mostly 
provide only part – say λ fraction - of total capital K invested in a business. Thus, borrowed 
amount of money L divided by K would equals λ. Thus, λ operates both as the loss sharing 
ratio for the bank and also as the leverage measure for the borrowing firms. The firm 
owners’ portion in capital would thus equal (1- λ) K. Of course, losses, if any, are to be 
shared between the firms and the bank in the same ratios as are their capital contributions 
i.e. (1-λ) and λ respectively.  
In mixed mudarabah profit sharing applies to earnings that are allocable to the part of 
capital K a bank provides to the firm. Thus, if P were distributable profits, λP would be 
allocable to the bank the pure financier. It is this part of profit which is the subject matter for 
sharing with the firm. Negotiations between the two lead to the decision that a fraction of 
this, say σ*, will go to the bank and the remaining (1- σ*) the firm will retain for 
entrepreneurial services it rendered to make bank money earn a return. It is easy to see what 
goes to the bank is a smaller fraction, say σ, of total profit P than σ*. For, σ* λP, the bank’s 
profit share, divided by P would equal σ* λ. In σ = σ* λ both σ* and λ being less than 1, their 
product σ must be smaller than either of them. The derivation of σ allows the treatment of 
the ratio issue at the macro level and helps construction of models to show, as in equation 
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(2), that profit sharing ratio σ is a function of four variables i.e. the expected rate of profit r 
on capital K, the proportion of borrowings λ in K, the market rate of interest ri and the risk 
premium or economic profit α (Hasan, 1985). 
)( 

  irr
where λ (ri + α) < r                         (2) 
It follows from equation (2) that in a competitive setting the sharing ratio σ for the 
bank at the macro level varies inversely with profit expectations r and directly with the 
remaining three determinants λ, ri, and α . We now change the explanation of these variables 
with reference to the mudarabah contract between the banks and their depositors so as to 
forge a credit control measure for Islamic banks. 
We assume r to be the rate of profit on capital K that a bank invests in business (r = 
P/K). The bank has (1- λ) and the depositors’ λ share in K. Likewise, σ* is the banks’ ratio 
for the sharing of profit with the depositors. Now, suppose the maximum leverage gain (risk 
premium) the central bank allows to banks is β. We may call it the leverage control rate 
(LCR). The upper limit for return on bank investment share KB = (1 – λ) K would thus be r 
+ β, the remaining profit accruing to depositors on their investment KD = λK. From profit P, 
the amount (1 – λ) P would be allocable to the bank on its share in K but it will also get σ* 
fraction of profit allocable to the deposits i.e. σ*λ P. Thus, for the bank we may set up: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
It is obvious from equation (3) that for any given values of r and λ the profit sharing 
ratio (PSR = σ) for the bank would vary directly with β. Thus, β can be a cost free policy 
variable that the central bank of a country can use for mandatory ex post adjustment of the 
PSR in Islamic finance to enforce fairness in the distribution of profits between the banks 
and the depositors.  
The use of the instrument would also force banks to adjust their leverage ratios via 
  of equation (2) to harmonize with changes in β.  For, the introduction of β as the control 
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variable into the picture would by definition affect α in equation (2) impacting in the process 
the size of σ the banks’ profit sharing ratio with businesses that is by making credit costlier 
or cheaper.  
Equation (2) provides us with a common sense and useful link between the profit 
sharing ratio of the banks and the rate of interest in a dual monetary system. Let us put λ/r 
equal to µ. This makes analysis easier. Take µ as a constant implying that only r and λ could 
vary such that their ratio stays unchanged.  
We now have a linear equation σ = µ (ri+ α) which passes through the origin µ being 
its slope. It sets up a positive relationship between profit sharing ratio σ and the rate of 
interest plus α as shown in Figure 2. It follows that for the same ri the profit sharing ratio σ 
may fluctuate with changes in leverage ratio λ or profit expectation r or α the risk premium. 
But it could also remain constant, if changes in λ and r take place in the same direction such 
that µ remains unchanged. We can now depict the equilibrium value for σ the profit sharing 
ratio and its relationship with its determinants as in Figure 2. An implicit assumption here is 
that risk premium α remains constant.6  
 
 
                                                             
6 Inserting the given values of σ, λ and r in equation (2) we can obtain (ri + α) = 10%. In fact, it is this 
composite value that the rate of interest ri represents in Figure 2. If we take interest rate ri = 8%,  α at 
2%  is assumed to remain unchanged. It is this rate which is in harmony with the other values marked 
in Section A of the Figure and coincides with that in its Section b. It is a simplifying assumption which 
we can abandon in a more complicated analysis. 
 
 
Figure 2: Profit sharing ratio in a state of equilibrium in Islamic Finance 
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An illustration 
From equation (3) we get the maximum possible equilibrium value for the profit 
sharing ratio as: 
                                                                        4λ1
r
β
σ   
It is obvious that for any given values of r and λ the profit-sharing ratio σ would vary 
directly with β. The relationship allows the Central Bank to use σ as a cost-free instrument 
for credit control.  
It is easy to see that the Central Bank of a country can lower β to increase the rate of 
return to the depositors leading to a reduction in bank margins. To keep their margins intact 
the banks are expected to demand higher profit sharing ratio  from the borrowing firms 
reducing the leverage lure for profits. Thus, β can be an effective control measure in the 
hands of a Central Bank to curb inflation. During recession an increase in β could boost the 
sagging business morale through brightening profit expectations. Demand for investment 
funds may look up and credit creation may fill up the possible gaps.  
We can find out in a given situation the leverage gain that is β by inserting the 
relevant values in equation (4). If the Central Bank finds the margin too high, it may fix a 
lower β as a control measure to dampen the leverage lure. 
Suppose in a particular case σ* = 0.5, λ = 0.425, return on capital r = 20% and σ = σ* 
λ = 0.2125. Putting these values in equation (4) in a state of equilibrium, we have: 
 
 
 
 
Thus the banks are earning on their part of investment 7.39% more than the overall 
return of 20% as the leverage gain. The Central Bank can reduce ex post profit sharing ratio 
by allowing a maximum value for β equal to say 6%. If we insert this value of β in equation 
(4) we get: 
                   σ = (0.06/0.2) (1- o.425) = 0. 1725                   (6) 
Thus, the shrinkage in the leverage gain by (7.39 – 6) = 1.39% reduces σ by 0.04 and 
must have a dampening effect on credit creation by the Islamic banks. Raising β may have 
the opposite effect.    
The use of β - the LCR - as a credit control measure in a dual financial system has 
several advantages over the traditional bank rate policy. Bank rate policy operates through 
 
 50.0739βgetweSolving
0.4251
0.2
β
0.2125


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the manipulation of the money-use price which conflicts with the Islamic ban on interest. In 
contrast, β leaves interest rate untouched; it operates directly on profit margins of both the 
financiers and the borrowing businesses having a better psychological impact. Interest rate 
is a blanket measure. It affects borrowings for all purposes in equal measure – relatively 
more urgent and socially desirable or frivolous. Possibly, using β would prove more 
amicable to pursue discretionary credit allocation policies i.e. for selective control of 
investment channels. Finally, changes in interest rate affect the entire financing system – all 
purposes, all modes and all security markets restricting the frequency of using it. It forces 
upon the central Bank a loss inflicting open market operations regime. β can be more 
flexible and selective; unlike the open market operations, it does not impose costs on the 
central Bank. (Hasan, 2010). 
LCR and other control measures 
Of the other credit control measures Central Banks use the various reserve ratios are 
important. For example, all banking institutions – Islamic or conventional – have to 
maintain a Statutory Reserve Account with the Central Bank of the country. They have to 
keep a minimum proportion of their eligible deposits all the time in this account. This 
proportion is called the Statutory Reserve Ratio or the SRR. Lowering (raising) this ratio 
enables the Central Banks to expand (contract) credit in the economy. The measure is 
Shari’ah neutral. So is the case with statutory cash ratios that banks are required to maintain 
against time and current deposits. Moral persuasion too poses no problem.  
The difficulty arises in the case of ‘open market operations’ as a measure for credit 
control. The Central Bank has to sell securities to mop up liquidity during inflation when 
prices of securities in stock with it are falling and has to buy them during the downturn 
when their prices are relatively high. Thus, in either case the Central Bank’s ability to 
control credit would depend on how much loss it is willing to absorb. The LCR we have 
suggested helps avoid this dilemma.  
5. Risk, profit and finance 
A primary attribute of competition is the tendency to annihilate economic profit 
(loss) and bring the prices of real goods and services to equality with their money costs of 
production. Economic theorists have therefore searched for the source of profit in what 
makes competition imperfect. Frank H. Knight (1921) argued with conviction that it was 
uncertainty born of dynamic change that made reality depart from the ideal profitless state in 
an economy. Uncertainty breeds risk and divides the society into those who prefer to take 
risks in the expectations of large gains and those who want to avoid risks in favour of 
getting sure specific, even if smaller incomes. Risk-preference and risk-aversion divided 
human beings into the hired and un-hired production factors in all societies independent of 
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time and space7. Entrepreneurs, however defined, fall in the un-hired category. They 
guarantee fixed specific returns to the hired factors of production including lenders of 
money, workers and property owners – in the form of interest, wages and rent. 
Entrepreneurs choose to be claimants of the residual business earnings in the expectations of 
large gains but have to simultaneously expose their investment to the risk of shrinkage (loss) 
if revenue receipts belie expectations and fall short of payments due to the hired factors. 
This is how capitalism operates. 
This inevitable division of people into hired and un-hired factors knocks at the 
bottom of a plea now gaining currency in Islamic economics. It is being argued that risk-
sharing could alone be the Islamic basis of pecuniary contracts. For, it is interest induced 
risk-transfer alone that has brought the world to the current chaos and would continue to do 
so unabated.  To be sure, this is not a new plea. Only a new cloak is being wrapped around 
an old edict in classical origin: ‘No risk, no gain’ (Hasan 2005).8 No one disputes that 
participatory finance is in principle a more desirable rather preferred mode for financing – 
Islamic or conventional - without distinction. But projecting as being currently done that 
risk-sharing is the only principle acceptable to the Shari’ah, that conventional banks transfer 
all their risks to others is untenable, rather perilous. To the naivety of this line of argument 
we shall soon return. 
The logic of capitalism not only presupposes the existence of hired factors of 
production - workers and the natural resources - but also of an initial facility of finance 
provided by bank credit to pay for wages. The recent heterodox view that finance is a sort of 
invisible ex ante flow in modern economies has elements of truth; it links well with Keynes 
(1930) according recognition to the importance of money as financial asset. The recognition 
led to viewing money as an interest bearing claim the banks could create or destroy at will 
in response to variations in the demand for money (liquidity) even though it carried no 
intrinsic value. 
   Islamic banks operate in a capitalistic system in competition with their 
conventional counterparts. They cannot do business in defiance of the systemic 
                                                            
7 This view of Knight is perhaps too simplistic. Is it really uncertainty or lack of means to face 
uncertainty that plays dominant role in dividing people into the hired and un-hired production factors 
i.e. into risk takers and risk-averters? To me it looks more a question belonging to income and wealth 
distribution than of temperamental differences.  
 
8 Presumably the connection is overdone by its proponents. Risk is neither commodity which the risk-
taker offers to society nor labour he does on some material to claim compensation. It is purely a 
specific mental state that instills in him the fear of adverse consequences of an action. He must desist 
from the action if he cannot overcome the fear or he must conquer his fear and take the consequence. 
Hence it is entirely his discretion to act and if he does he must alone bear the consequence. Mastery 
over the fear of adversity is a great virtue both psychologically and morally; the society does needs 
such people. But a moral valuation is not the same thing as an economic valuation (Baqir-as-Sadr, 
1984, 75-76) 
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requirements; they can possibly observe the Islamic ban on interest but would find survival 
difficult without credit creation. Fractional reserve system is a pre-requisite for credit 
creation. Hence, suggestions of keeping 100% reserve against deposits in Islamic banking 
are impracticable. It would thus be helpful to see briefly how banks create credit to 
understand and evaluate measures central banks use for controlling it to keep the system 
stable.     
Risk-sharing and Islamic finance. 
The empirical evidence claiming that Islamic banks had faced the crisis better than 
their conventional rivals though dubious, contributed to the resuscitation of the old precept: 
‘no risk no gain’ claiming that risk-sharing is the sole principle of Islamic finance. To us, 
the claim raises some serious questions. Does Islam disallow pre-fixed return on investment 
under all circumstance? Are sharing schemes entirely free of risk-transfer? Is risk-sharing 
always equitable? Or is interest-based financing entirely risk-free? Questions of the sort 
remain to be answered.  
The claim under review is based on a rather restrictive interpretation of a leading 
Islamic maxim derived from a Prophetic tradition that says: ‘Benefit goes with liability’9. 
The problem is with the interpretation of the word ‘liability’ in the expression as the bearing 
of risk in financial transactions10. Islam allows profit and loss sharing contracts among 
financing modes but not to the exclusion of others considered equally valid. Risk bearing is 
a consequence - not the cause - of such contracts. To put it straight, there is no such thing in 
Islam as a risk sharing contract which when entered into would result in the sharing of profit 
or loss.  Liability in the maxim focuses on compensation, not on risk; for risk is not a 
tradable commodity. Risk-taking per se cannot contribute to production; ownership of 
useful things including capital does. Equity of a profit share can be better judged with 
reference to capital investment not with reference to risk.  
The contention finds support from another Islamic maxim, an inverse of that under 
discussion. It is derived from the Qur’an (2:275) and says: ‘Liability accompanies gain’. 
There has to be a compensation Thus, for a claim to profit, financier is liable to bear ex post 
loss not the ex-ante risk (Baqir as-Sadr 1984). 
 Conventional finance is of course dominated by interest based transactions, but it is 
far from truth that it entails no risk-sharing. Equity holders share risk and equity dominates 
in long-term financing. Even when loans are advanced on interest bank face the risk of 
                                                            
9 For a useful and detailed discussion on the maxim see Prof  Laldin (2013, 156-160). 
 
10 Presumably, putting the maxim as ‘benefit goes with liability to compensate’ – becomes better 
expressive of its import. It would also commensurate well with another Islamic maxim – legal 
permission negates liability. Candidly, the liability to bear loss in business cannot be abolished; it 
would go against the Islamic ban on interest. For details on the quoted maxim, see Professor Laldin 
(2013, 164-166). 
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default and of adverse price movements in collaterals. That banks collapsed like house of 
cards in the current turmoil is evidence enough to see that interest-based finance is not 
always or entirely risk-free. Likewise, Islamic banks do transfer risk via hedging contracts. 
They also take collaterals to cove default risks. Bulk of transactions Shari’ah supervisors 
approve is debt based; participatory finance despite all effort and pleadings is still not 
popular. The valid distinction between Islamic and conventional finance is not that one is 
entirely risk-sharing and the other is entirely risk-transferring; it lies in their proportion in 
the mix11.    
  Furthermore, it is not true that Islam bans risk transfer. It is a matter of 
interpretation. Banning interest does not imply an automatic ban on risk-transfer. Indeed, 
there is an argument that in pure classical mudarabah where the worker/entrepreneur is 
empty-handed the financier transfers a part of his risk to the worker. The financier does not 
make any payment to him in case of loss. He reduces his own loss equal to the transfer 
earnings of the worker; in a way risk is in part passed on to him (El-Gamal 2014, 1). 
Likewise, risk-sharing need not always be equitable, may be, it is rarely so. Risk being ex 
ante has no cardinal measure. The sharing ratio is a crude proxy for the division of profit. 
No one can demonstrate a one-on-one correspondence between the profit share of the parties 
and their risk exposures. Justice and fair play is the first requirement for calling something 
‘Islamic’. The difficulty is that tons of juristic writings analyzing contract forms provide 
little help to determine whether or not there is injustice in the exchange contract. 
Arbitrariness is the rule12.  
6. Concluding observations 
We have examined the measures Central Banks can use to regulate credit creation 
from Islamic perspective and have suggested a new instrument based on the Islamic profit 
sharing norm. Its merit is that it can impact both categories of banks – Islamic and 
conventional – in the same direction without imposing costs on the Central Banks. 
The year 2009 was a critical one for Islamic Finance as the downturn tested the 
resilience of the institutions and financing structures that endeavour to comply with the 
ethical and moral investment guidelines that form the core of the Shariah law. The crisis, 
however, showed that the sector has not been without its casualties, with high-profile 
Islamic names such as Tamweel, Amlak and The Investment Dar falling foul of the credit 
crunch (Howladar, 2010). Thus, the industry is likely to face increasing challenge in the 
                                                            
11It is interesting to note that some writers find Islamic finance inherently more risk-averse and thus 
holding the pace of economic development in Muslim countries; they produce evidence. In contrast, 
those who argue that it is in principle based on risk-sharing have nothing to show as testimony. 
 
12Contextual to n.4, the profit which the owner of a commodity obtains through its sale is based not on 
the risk involved but on the basis of the commodity proprietorship, even if the price (and profit) 
increases due to his transferring it to the market for ready availability to the consumers for he 
continues to remain its owner (Baqir-as-Sadr 1984, 76). 
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future. Diversification, product innovation and the standardization of norms along with the 
harmonization of regulations across countries can go a long way to help Islamic finance 
industry face the impeding challenge.  
Risk sharing in finance is not exclusive principle for Islamic finance. Fixed return 
contracts are permitted. On ground, they are much more in use than the sharing contracts. In 
fact their role in promoting growth and stability is dominant. 
Islam stands for freedom of the individual and the markets but not at the cost of 
social well-being and fair play. The religion is not anti-rich and grants all protection to 
private earnings and wealth. But its norms of legitimacy are not a matter for market 
arbitration. State regulation of market behaviour and practices carries undisputed evidence 
over time and space in history. Islamic requirements for the fulfilment of basic needs, 
removal of poverty, reduction in inequities and keeping the balances straight in all spheres 
of life presupposes a substantial state intervention in the economic life of the community 
with discretion. Government intervention in economic activities is to be a source of stability, 
not of chaotic fluctuations under Islamic dispensation.  
However, to pronounce ethical norms is one thing; to see them operate on ground is 
another. It would be far from truth to opine that conventional financial settings are devoid of 
ethical norms of behaviour; the lament is that it is the blatant and continual violation of 
these norms that has dragged the world to the brink of disaster in recent years. 
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